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Bentham’s Theory of Evidence: 
Setting a Context1
William Twining
Abstract
Bentham’s massive writings on evidence, procedure and judicial organi-
sation (EPJ) survive in over 13,000 pages of manuscript in addition to 
15–20 published works, for some of which full manuscripts no longer 
survive. These are all quite closely linked. In order to start to understand 
the Rationale of Judicial Evidence it is useful to consider it in three broad 
contexts: Bentham’s other works in addition to those on EPJ, especially 
those works on the pannomion and the constitutional writings; attempts 
to construct a ‘theory of (judicial) evidence’ in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion of common law, especially those of J. B. Thayer and J. H. Wigmore; 
and recent efforts at UCL and elsewhere to develop evidence as a distinct 
multi-disciplinary field.
Keywords: Bentham; evidence; legal studies; jurisprudence; J. B. Thayer; 
J. H. Wigmore
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I feel rather like the Auto-icon, a relic of the past wheeled out to observe 
your proceedings impassively or cryptically. In 1983 I felt that I was the only 
person in the world who had read all of the Rationale of Judicial Evidence 
– except perhaps Jimmy Burns who seemed to have read everything 
by Bentham. I had also read An Introductory View, Scotch Reform, and 
Dumont’s Traité des preuves judiciaires in both French and English. I had 
looked at several hundred unpublished Bentham manuscripts on adjec-
tive law and had tried to transcribe some. Surely I was unique. But there 
was not at the time funding for an edition of the Rationale for the Collected 
Works, let alone the ocean of manuscripts relating to evidence and proce-
dure (adjective law), judicial organisation, Scotch Reform and several 
minor works which were all intimately related to each other.
In 1980–81 Claire Gobbi and I prepared a report for the Bentham 
Committee on Bentham’s writings on evidence and cognate works.2 Claire 
did a detailed survey on Scotch Reform and we did a more cursory survey 
of the published writings and unpublished manuscripts on evidence, 
procedure and judicial organisation (EPJ), and some borderline cognate 
works, including Court of Lords’ Delegates, Lord Brougham Displayed, 
Truth versus Ashhurst and Justice and Codification Petitions. We concluded 
that the total material on EPJ is directly related to 17 published works of 
varying length and 13,326 manuscript pages.3 We also concluded that all 
these works were so closely interrelated that ‘it would be artificial (and 
risky from a scholarly point of view) to try to treat them as discrete units’. 
Furthermore, we estimated that the combined works in this general area 
would fill between four and seven volumes of the Collected Works, quite 
apart from the J. S. Mill edition of the Rationale of Judicial Evidence. While 
the unity of this vast collection was recognised, it was decided that it 
would not be feasible to obtain funding for a single major project, and 
work on this area was adjourned sine die.
My interest in Bentham on evidence was part of a broader project to 
rethink the subject of evidence in law in a broader framework than had 
been traditional. I abandoned my plan to help with editing the Rationale 
of Judicial Evidence and instead published a short exploratory book called 
Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore, which included a detailed 
précis of the Rationale.4 As a result I have not reread the Rationale or 
any other of Bentham’s works in the area for about 35 years, except An 
Introductory View, which is probably still the best starting-point for stud-
ying Bentham on evidence. It is short, relatively readable, used less edito-
rial licence than Dumont’s Traité, and contains some material not in the 
Rationale, including Bentham’s critique of Gilbert (see below). 
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To illustrate how alone I felt, let me begin with an anecdote. When I 
started to take an interest in Bentham on evidence in the 1970s, I thought 
that it would be nice to own a copy of the original J. S. Mill edition of 
1827. In about 1980 I called in at Wildy’s, the famous law bookshop in 
Lincoln’s Inn Passage, and enquired if a copy had ever come their way. 
The manager looked puzzled and then said, ‘Wait a minute’, and went to 
consult a box of dog-eared old-style index cards. He came back smiling. 
They did have a search out for it. However, there was one person ahead 
of me in the queue. Uninhibited by data protection, I gained access to the 
card. It read ‘R. Cross’, with a London address, that is, before Rupert Cross 
was elected a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1948. Cross became 
the leading evidence scholar of his generation in England. So far as I know 
he never owned a copy of the Rationale and never even cited it. For his 
generation Bentham on evidence was an almost complete blank. 
I stopped working on Bentham on evidence nearly 35 years ago. I 
have not read any of these works in toto since – although I have occasion-
ally dipped into them, using the indexes of Mill’s edition of the Rationale 
and the useful one in the Bowring edition. Instead of discussing the details 
of that monstrous work I shall try to set it in a broader context and suggest 
some questions that scholars brave enough to dive into this ocean of 
thought may need to investigate.
1. What Is a Theory of Evidence?
All of you have drawn inferences from evidence in the last 24 hours. The 
news media have also been full of items involving evidence – fake news, 
poisoning in Salisbury, chemical weapons in Syria, weapons of mass 
destruction, dope testing of athletes, and investigations and speculations 
about Donald Trump have all featured in the media recently. Police inves-
tigations, scenes of crime officers, forensic anthropologists and unsolved 
mysteries of many kinds are staples in popular culture. Sherlock Holmes is 
the patron saint of Evidencers. After September 11 2001, one of the most 
iconic events of recent times, the whole American intelligence system was 
shaken up, because Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet and Robert Gates 
decided that ‘American intelligence agencies did not possess the analytic 
depth or the right methods of analysis accurately to assess possible 
threats’.5 In short, the FBI and the CIA had not been taking analysis of 
evidence seriously enough.6 The Director of the FBI at the time was Robert 
Mueller.
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‘The field of evidence is no other than the field of knowledge’,7 wrote 
Bentham, and based his approach on the ordinary common-sense inferen-
tial reasoning accessible to nearly all citizens, indeed humans. Moreover, 
all of us nearly all of the time (except in law and evidence-based medi-
cine) live in a world of free proof, that is, free from rules of admissibility 
or weight or quantum or priority. Only in law and some rigid bureaucratic 
regimes are there formal binding rules of evidence. They are diminishing 
in extent and, as we shall see, lawyers, especially evidence scholars, 
greatly exaggerate their importance.8 Nearly all of you assume some-
thing like Bentham’s theory of evidence, that is, that there are no formal 
binding rules of evidence.
What is a theory of evidence? And what kind of theory was 
Bentham’s? I suggest that theories of evidence come in various shapes and 
sizes. First, we need to distinguish between a theory of evidence in law 
and evidence as a potential multi-disciplinary field. The latter idea has 
been promoted by Professor David Schum, a psychologist and statistician, 
who has also taken a special interest in law, historiography, probability 
theory and intelligence analysis.9 Schum’s ambitious attempts to create 
a distinct field or domain led first to a modest project in the Netherlands 
in 199410 and then to a major programme at UCL which, despite being 
wound up in 2011 with an edited volume called Evidence, Inference and 
Enquiry, is still unfinished business.11 The concern there was to explore 
the commonalities and differences, epistemological, logical, institutional 
and technical, about the concepts, frameworks, theories and technolo-
gies (as in forensic science) found in thinking about, reasoning and using 
evidence in disciplines ranging from archaeology and astronomy through 
probability theory and proof of the existence of God right up to zoology 
and zymurgy. Every empirically oriented discipline and occupation is 
concerned with evidence.
Bentham is clearly relevant to this ambitious multi-disciplinary UCL 
project, but his main writings on the subject were directly related to law. 
Should we think of his theory as a theory of the law of evidence or, more 
broadly, of evidence in law? Or is it wider than that? There have been 
quite a few attempts to construct such theories in England (especially 
during the nineteenth century), in Continental Europe (especially France 
and Scandinavia), and above all in the United States. These have had 
varied objectives.12 Most of them were concerned to construct a coherent 
account, both analytical and normative, of the law of evidence in munic-
ipal, i.e. domestic, law. Let me mention just four. James Fitzjames Stephen 
(1829–94) tried to subsume all of the seemingly disparate rules of the 
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common law of evidence under the principle of relevancy.13 Exclude all 
irrelevant evidence, admit the best evidence. Sir Frederick Pollock and 
others called this a ‘splendid mistake’. James Bradley Thayer (1831–1902) 
superseded Stephen, who was treated as being correct in identifying rele-
vance as a key concept, but having erred in trying to subsume the law 
of evidence under a principle of relevance: this is because the rules were 
exceptions to the principle of free proof. Thayer, writing at the end of nine-
teenth century, maintained that the common law of evidence was based 
on two principles:
(1) that nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of 
some matter requiring to be proved; and (2) that everything which 
is thus probative should come in, unless a clear ground of policy of 
law excludes it.14
In other words, exclude all irrelevant evidence and admit all relevant 
evidence unless there is a clear ground of policy of law which excludes 
it.15 In this view the bulk of the law of evidence consisted of a disparate 
series of exceptions to a principle of free proof; these exceptions are based 
on different grounds of policy, such as national security, preservation of 
family relations, lawyer–client relations, unreliability (e.g. hearsay) and 
what in Anglo-American law today is expressed in terms of excluding any 
evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.16
Thayer is important for three reasons. First, his theory is generally 
accepted as the one that best explains the common law of evidence even 
today; it is the basis of the Federal Rules of Evidence and many recent 
attempts at codification; and nearly all the controversial topics such as 
hearsay and improperly obtained evidence can be treated as internal 
debates within Thayer’s theory.17 The second reason is that although 
Thayer favoured the retention of a few exclusionary rules, he is an intel-
lectual descendant of Bentham (mediated by nineteenth-century writers) 
and a bridge between today’s common law of evidence and, it could be 
argued, modern Continental systems.18 A third reason for Thayer’s impor-
tance is that he taught John Henry Wigmore, who for at least 40 years 
from 1900 dominated American evidence law through his great Treatise, 
which had no rivals until quite recently.19 
Wigmore was a fairly loyal disciple of Thayer’s, but he glossed his 
ideas in two important ways that are relevant here. First, although, like 
Thayer, he wanted to retain a few exclusionary rules, he maintained 
that these were in fact far less important than was commonly believed 
BENTHAM’S THEORY OF EV IDENCE :  SETT ING A CONTEXT 25
by practitioners and evidence scholars; furthermore they had steadily 
diminished in importance and scope during the nineteenth century. But 
most scholars and discourse about evidence in law omitted the basic 
principle(s) to which the disparate rules were exceptions. If the law of 
evidence is a fragmented series of exceptions to a principle of free proof, 
surely one should first study that principle. Wigmore put it this way: the 
study of evidence in law consists of two parts: the law of evidence, which 
he misleadingly called ‘the Trial Rules’, and ‘the Principles of Judicial 
Proof as found in Logic, Psychology and General Experience’.20 The prin-
ciples are anterior to and more important than the trial rules and have 
been neglected by lawyers. Apart from his lengthy attack on the technical 
system of procedure, most of Bentham’s Rationale is concerned with these 
principles. Until the 1970s Bentham and Wigmore were the only scholars 
who had paid sustained attention to these principles in law, though there 
was scattered interest elsewhere in logic, probability theory, forensic 
science, psychology and historiography.21 
Wigmore’s second deviation from, or maybe just a gloss on, Thayer 
arose in the context of constructing a code of evidence for the American 
Law Institute.22 Wigmore recommended that the rules should be ‘direc-
tory not mandatory’;23 that is, they should not be binding on bench and 
bar. This is very close to Bentham’s ‘cautionary instructions’: the law of 
evidence should consist of non-binding guidelines rather than peremp-
tory rules. However, Wigmore, who was quite conservative, advised that 
the code should contain precepts that followed closely the existing law, 
and his draft occupied 550 pages. But that again is not very different from 
Bentham, who discusses most of the concerns of the law of evidence while 
considering what guidance should be given to judges.24
Two of Wigmore’s contemporaries, Edmund Morgan and Charles E. 
Clark, went even closer to a Benthamite approach in urging that most of 
the existing rules should be abolished and much more should be left to 
judicial discretion.25 In England we are not far from that position today in 
civil evidence; most teaching of the law of evidence focusses on criminal 
evidence, which survives in truncated form, as if evidence scholars were 
saying: ‘What can we teach if there are no rules? If there are no rules there 
is nothing to learn.’ My answer is: there is a great deal.26 
There is room for further research as to how close Morgan, Clark 
and, from an earlier generation, Charles F. Chamberlayne were to being 
Benthamite in their approach to judicial evidence.27 But it should be 
noted that while Wigmore’s great treatise on the ‘Trial Rules’ was a best-
seller, Chamberlayne’s treatise foundered at the first edition. Wigmore’s 
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Principles probably only reached a third edition because the publishers 
needed to keep their most successful author happy. It is as if practitioners 
were saying, where there are no rules, there is nothing to look up. 
Before moving on to Bentham’s theory of evidence and what I have 
called his ‘antinomian thesis’, let me intrude another personal anecdote. 
In 1972 I heard Rupert Cross (now Sir) – the same person who had not 
obtained the Rationale (at least from Wildy’s) – say in a debate on crim-
inal evidence, ‘I am working for the day when my subject is abolished.’28 
Although this sounded Benthamite in spirit, my reaction was not ‘He is 
following Bentham’; rather it was political, a right-wing attack on some 
important and worthwhile rules, for I thought, and still think, that some 
safeguards for accused persons are worth preserving.
More important jurisprudentially, Cross’s statement just did not 
make sense. For how could anyone abolish the subject of evidence in law? 
For inferential reasoning from evidence pervades decision-making in liti-
gation and all other legal contexts as it does in other spheres of life. One 
could not abolish the field of evidence in law or in everyday life any more 
than one could abolish the rules of logic. 
For me the big question has been: what would one study if there were 
no rules? Wigmore and Bentham provided a starting-point. Wigmore 
said, ‘The Principles of Proof’; Bentham said: ‘abolish all formal rules 
addressed to the will but pay attention to instructions addressed to the 
understanding’. Their answers went a long way to answering my question, 
except in one major respect: they focused on judicial decision-making. In 
my view that is much too narrow: adopting a total-process model of liti-
gation and like processes, I have argued that basing decisions concerning 
questions of fact on inferential reasoning from evidence was an aspect 
of the agencyof many kinds of actors with different roles in changing 
contexts; for the subject of evidence in law extends far beyond adjudi-
cation to include such matters as fact investigation, decisions to make a 
claim or to prosecute, plea bargaining and settlement out of court and on 
through post-trial decisions, for example by parole boards and probation 
officers. In this perspective adjudicative fact-determination by judges or 
juries is wholly exceptional, especially in a system which relies heavily on 
guilty pleas and on lay people – magistrates and jurors – to make final 
determinations. Many decisions relating to evidence are taken in the 
shadow of the law.
What kind of theory was Bentham’s? First, it is just part of a general 
theory of procedure and adjudication which in turn belongs to a compre-
hensive political and legal philosophy. I think that Halévy got this right: 
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Bentham’s main period of work on evidence, roughly 1802 to 1813, coin-
cided with changes in his political views and preceded Constitutional 
Code.29 Evidence is part of adjective law, which is concerned, along with 
judicial organisation, in implementing the pannomion, which in turn is a 
means of implementing his democratic theory based on utility. They are 
all of a piece. 
Thus Bentham’s theory of evidence (or evidence and proof) in law 
is primarily a design theory for a system of adjective law, the main role 
of which is to implement substantive law assumed to be consonant with 
utility. The direct end of procedure is rectitude of decision, that is, correct 
application of law deemed to be good to true facts by means of reasoning 
based on relevant evidence. The indirect end of procedure is avoidance 
of preponderant vexation, expense and delay also judged by utility. Thus 
evidence is the means to arrive at truth in adjudication, and Bentham 
firmly stated that no artificial binding rules could promote rectitude of 
decision. There should be no formal rules of evidence, although I am not 
confident that Bentham was serious about this in respect of procedure. 
A typical passage comes in discussion of the estimation of the proba-
tive force of circumstantial evidence:
On this as on every other part of the field of evidence, rules capable 
of rendering right decisions secure, are what the nature of things 
denies. To the establishment of rules by which misdecision is 
rendered more probable than it would otherwise be, the nature of 
man is prone. To put the legislator and the judge upon their guard 
against such rashness, is all that the industry of the free inquirer 
can do in favour of the ends of justice.30
In short, peremptory rules of evidence are inevitably going to be 
over-inclusive or under-inclusive.31 
Bentham’s espousal of the natural system and his attack on all 
formal rules of evidence seemed extreme to lawyers in his time and still 
seems so to most lawyers today. But let us pause a moment: how far is 
legal decision-making based on rules of evidence today?
In modern law it is generally accepted that relevance is a matter of 
logic, not law. As Thayer put it, ‘The law has no mandamus to the logical 
faculty’.32 Yet, as Bentham saw clearly, the most important means of exclu-
sion is on grounds of irrelevance, but that is not a ‘rule’. 
Secondly, with only very minor exceptions, we have no rules of 
weight or probative force. That too is a matter of logic and general 
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experience. Wigmore went so far as to say that talk of rules of weight or 
credibility is akin to ‘moral treason on our system’.33
Similarly there are almost no rules of quantum, i.e. specifications of 
the amount of evidence that is necessary for a decision of guilt or liability. 
That gets rid of the old numerical system that specified the number of 
witnesses or the amount of evidence. Rules requiring corroboration have 
atrophied and have barely survived except in rare cases of treason, perjury 
and procuration of girls for prostitution.34
Especially interesting in the digital era is Bentham’s attack on priority 
rules and the incapacity of classes of witnesses. Sir Jeffrey Gilbert’s The 
Law of Evidence (written in the 1720s, published 1754) gave Bentham 
a clear target to attack. Gilbert had organised his account of the law of 
evidence around a scale of rules of weight linked to ‘the best evidence 
rule’ (now known as an evidentiary ‘ghost’).35 
Bentham’s Influence?
Today there are almost no priority rules, no rules of weight or probative 
force, and hardly any rules about capacity of witnesses or corrobora-
tion. By 1900 nearly all of Bentham’s main targets had disappeared from 
English law, but not because of his direct ‘influence’. There is no doubt 
that nearly all changes in the law of evidence since Bentham’s day have 
moved in the direction that he charted, but in a piecemeal and slow 
fashion that he would have deplored. There are remarkable affinities in 
trends towards simplification, flexibility and greater judicial discretion. 
Christopher Allen in The Law of Evidence in Victorian England (1997) 
has convincingly punctured many exaggerated claims about Bentham’s 
immense influence, especially in relation to evidence. His story shows 
that, for the most part, proposed changes had to win the support of the 
legal profession and that by no means all of the proponents of change 
were Benthamites; moreover, those who used Bentham’s arguments 
rarely attributed the ideas to him. Rather, the uneven processes of change 
were due to ‘a variety of social, political, and intellectual pressures’ during 
the Victorian era.36
Bentham’s ideas may have seemed radical, his attacks on the legal 
profession may not have forwarded his case and his influence on law 
reform may have not been as direct as has often been stated, but there is 
no doubt that the mainstream set of working assumptions in law today, in 
most kinds of decision-making and in everyday life, are dominant, despite 
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post-modernist, relativist and other sceptical tendencies. Seek empirical 
truth by informal inferential reasoning based on evidence in the presence 
of the parties.
There is one exception that we need to keep an eye on. The more 
doctrinaire versions of evidence-based medicine (EBM) are established 
on something akin to the priority rules set out in Gilbert’s The Law of 
Evidence (1754), which Bentham destroyed over two centuries ago in An 
Introductory View (ed. James Mill, 1810). When I recently visited a doctor, 
he brought up on screen an algorithm which set out priority rules for 
ranking classes of evidence, with randomised, repeated, controlled clin-
ical trials at the top, and expert opinion near the bottom. Luckily, he was 
also interested in what I thought. In its purer forms EBM allowed no room 
for intuition, judgement based on experience, let alone ‘a patient’s idio-
syncratic preferences’.37 Within EBM there has been a softening of dogma, 
but beware: computer programmers and Big Data want priority rules 
and are gaining influence. Are protocols and algorithms in the context 
of bureaucracy and modern technology not creeping in the direction of 
Gilbert’s priority rules? Come back JB.
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Appendix
BENTHAM PROJECT
Evidence, Procedure and Judicial Organization: a report to the Executive 
Committee 
1. At its meeting on October 22nd 1980, the Executive resolved to ask Miss 
Gobbi to undertake a pilot survey of the manuscripts relating to procedure 
and judicial administration in order to provide a basis for a preliminary 
assessment of their extent and their relationship to the manuscripts on 
evidence. This survey was prompted by Professor Twining’s memorandum 
of August 25th 1980, headed ‘Adjective Law and Judicial Organization’, 
which surveyed the history of the Evidence Project and raised some ques-
tions about a possible strategy for dealing with the writings on evidence, 
procedure and judicial organization as a whole (hereafter EPJ). 
2. Miss Gobbi began work on the survey part-time in October 1980. To begin 
with she concentrated on Scotch Reform, which proved to be more extensive, 
more complex and more significant than had hitherto been appreciated. 
Accordingly she did a rather more thorough analysis of the relevant manu-
scripts than had originally been envisaged; and she made a detailed report 
on this, a précis of which is attached as Appendix II to this memorandum. 
In September 1981 Professor Twining and Miss Gobbi spent several days 
on a preliminary survey of the boxes containing manuscripts on procedure 
and judicial administration. It must be emphasised that this involved only a 
very cursory examination of the material, but it provided a basis for making 
a rough estimate of the amount of material and, in general terms, of its 
relationship to Bentham’s published writings in this area. A more thorough 
appraisal of the Evidence material had already been completed as part of 
the evidence project. Accordingly we have decided to submit this composite 
report on writings on EPJ in order to enable the Executive to develop some 
long-term plans for work in the area. We emphasise that the findings on 
procedure and judicial administration are only tentative. 
3. Classification of material. So far as possible we have tried to identify all 
material relating to the following categories: 
(a) Evidence, including manuscripts marked ‘Evidence and 
Procedure’; 
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(b) Procedure, fairly narrowly conceived: the bulk of this material 
consists of (i) manuscripts prior to 1800; (ii) manuscripts relating 
to the ‘Principles of [Judicial] Procedure’, mainly from the periods 
1800–1805 and 1823–28; (iii) Projet Matière; and (iv) ‘Letter to the 
Electors of Great Britain and Ireland’. 
(c) Judicial administration, including aspects of judicial organization 
not covered by the Constitutional Code and miscellaneous writings 
on administration of justice. 
(d) Scotch Reform and ‘Court of Lords Delegates’. 
(e) Borderline and doubtful cases, including Lord Brougham 
Displayed, Truth versus Ashurst, Justice and Codification Petitions 
(see Appendix I).
So far as possible we have tried to relate each body of manuscript either to 
a particular published work or to a specific projected work. In most cases 
this has proved to be possible, but there are naturally some exceptions and 
some unresolved problems. 
4. The relevant published works and the main bodies of manuscript mate-
rial covered by the categories in paragraph 3 are outlined in the chart in 
Appendix I. From this it will be seen that the total material on evidence, 
procedure and judicial administration is directly related to approximately 
17 published works of varying length and 33,326 pages of manuscript. 
5. On the basis of this survey, we have come to the following tentative 
conclusions about the body of material. 
(a) There is, as we suspected, a close interelationship between the 
writings on evidence, procedure and judicial administration, with 
the result that it would be artificial (and risky from a scholarly 
point of view) to try to treat them as [discrete] units. There is 
also a close relationship with the constitutional writings, so that a 
general project on EPJ would be a natural successor to the volumes 
of Constitutional Code. 
(b) Much of the material is repetitive, including early drafts 
of subsequently published works (e.g. the Rationale), with 
considerable overlaps between the various bodies of material. 
Although this will require careful checking, it is our impression 
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that most of Bentham’s ideas on evidence and procedure were 
fairly stable and that much of the early material on these subjects 
is sufficiently similar to the later writings to make extensive 
publication of the early writings difficult to justify. It may well 
prove to be adequate to make quite a lot of the material available 
to scholars in the form of rough working typescripts, (as has 
already been done with the evidence) to assist them to identify 
particular passages in unpublished manuscripts. No decision 
need be taken on this issue at this stage, but our findings do 
suggest that the scale of the task of preparing the main writings 
on EPJ is rather less than we had anticipated. In our judgment 
the total number of CW volumes required to cover the general 
area would be not less than four volumes and not more than 
seven volumes (for details, see below). 
(c) Because of the close interconnections between this body of 
material it would be very helpful both for editors and for users of 
CW volumes to have a composite analytical index of all the EPJ 
writings and, in the published volumes, to have a single system of 
cross-referencing this material. 
(d) For the above versions, it would be highly desirable, if feasible, 
for work on editing—especially preliminary editing—of all the EPJ 
material to proceed roughly contemporaneously. This suggests that 
a relatively large scale exercise carried on over a relatively short 
period of time (say 4–5 years) would be preferable to tackling 
individual volumes seriatim over a longer period. 
(e) Some of the material, notably Scotch Reform and ‘Court of 
Lords Delegates’, may have a broader appeal than we had originally 
anticipated. These works are not solely of interest in respect of EPJ, 
for they deal extensively with matters of language, oaths, various 
administrative and a lot else besides. They are also of historical 
interest, not least in relation to the question of the development 
of Bentham’s political views (see for this Claire Gobbi’s Report on 
Scotch Reform). 
6. Possible CW volumes: a provisional scenario. 
(a) Evidence
(i) ‘Introductory View’ and ‘Swear Not At All’ (1 vol.).
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(ii) Possibly Treatise [of Judicial Evidence] or Traité [des 
preuves judiciares] as a work by Dumont and Bentham, with 
supplementary manuscript material (est. 75–150 pp). (1 
vol.). (see WLT memorandum of 25.8.80). 
(iii) Exclude the Rationale of Judicial Evidence from 
CW on the grounds (a) that almost none of the original 
manuscript survives; (b) a modestly priced facsimile of 
the J.S. Mill edition has recently been published; (c) very 
little could be added to (b) in a CW edition, except a few 
notes, cross-references and an improved index, most of 
which could be covered by a comprehensive index for the 
EPJ volumes. 
(b) Procedure 
(i) Most of the original manuscript of the ‘Principles of 
[Judicial] Procedure’ (ed. Doane) appears to survive 
and presents a task similar in scale and difficulty to the 
‘Introductory View’, i.e. it requires re-editing, but this is, by 
the standards of the project, relatively straightforward. Projet 
Matière is a short work, which presumably should be included 
in CW and might well be included in the same volume as the 
‘Principles’. Our provisional judgment is that most of the 
earlier procedure MSS can be treated as early versions of the 
‘Principles’; if this proves to be correct, only a limited amount 
of the early procedure material needs to be included in CW, 
in which case all of the procedure writings to be included in 
CW might fit into one volume of 350–450 pages. 
(c) Judicial Administration 
(i) Scotch Reform. On the basis of Miss Gobbi’s study it seems 
that this will require to be edited ab initio and will probably 
fill a substantial volume (est. 500 pages). Given the potential 
interest of this work we feel that it deserves quite a high 
priority within the project. 
(ii) ‘Court of Lords Delegates’. Prima facie it seems that this 
will also require a volume of its own, but it might be possible to 
include some additional cognate writings, e.g. ‘[Draught of a 
New] Plan [for the Organisation of the] Judicial Establishment 
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for France’. This material requires further examination before 
any definite decisions are taken. If overlapping material in 
Scotch Reform and ‘Court of Lords Delegates’ was excluded, it 
might be possible to include both of these works in a single 
volume, but we are rather doubtful about this. 
(iii) Other judicial administration material, including 
borderline and dubious cases. This includes Lord Brougham 
Displayed, ‘Equity Dispatch Court [Plan]’ and Bill, ‘[Draught 
of a New Plan]’, Elements of the Art of Packing and Justice and 
Codification Petitions and other opera minora and fragments. 
The relationship of them to other of Bentham’s writings has 
yet to be explained. The scale of the publishable material 
and the difficulty of editing it and its potential interest are, 
at least for us, largely a matter of speculation. Our very 
tentative conclusion is that this material is likely to take up 
not less than two and not more than four, conceivably five, 
volumes of CW. 
Conclusion 
Our provisional estimate is that the total number of volumes of EPJ in 
CW is likely to be not less than four volumes and not more than seven 
volumes, made up as follows: evidence (1–2); procedure (1); judicial 
administration (2–4). Our very tentative conclusion is that four or five 
volumes would suffice, if the Rationale is excluded and repetitive manu-
script material is treated quite selectively. 
7. Possible strategies 
On the basis of the foregoing it is possible to outline several alterna-
tive strategies for dealing with EPJ. Three main strategic alternatives 
present themselves, each of which is subject to many variants. Briefly, 
these are: (a) A volume by volume approach, for example starting with 
‘Introductory View’ and ‘Swear Not At All’, proceeding to Scotch Reform 
and leaving open decisions about future volumes for the time being; (b) 
A single major project or programme involving several editors and assis-
tants working simultaneously and in close liaison over a period of 4–5 
years; (c) A two-stage project: stage one would involve dealing with all 
the material on procedure and judicial administration in much the same 
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way as the evidence material has already been dealt with and producing a 
working analytical index of all the material, without a view to immediate 
publication. The second stage would involve editing selected material for 
publication either on a volume by volume basis or as part of a co-ordi-
nated programme as in (b). 
8. The relative advantages and disadvantages of each of these approaches 
have been rehearsed in discussion on several occasions. We shall not 
attempt to repeat all the relevant arguments here. In our view, (b) is 
clearly the most desirable, if it is feasible; there are, however, several 
difficulties, notably that it would require a major fund-raising exercise, 
several editors would have to be recruited, extra accommodation might 
be needed and arrangements for publication would need to be negoti-
ated in advance. Professor Twining has always been opposed to (a) on 
the grounds that the risk of error is too great, enormous duplication of 
effort is involved and the utility of individual volumes will be consider-
ably less than an integrated group of volumes, (c) represents a compro-
mise position, with the advantage that it is more manageable than (b) 
and the disadvantage that there will inevitably be some duplication of 
effort. The work on stage 1 is done by different people from stage 2 or if 
there is- a substantial gap in time between the two stages. Accordingly in 
our view the first question for the Executive to determine is whether the 
prospects for overcoming the obstacles to (b) were such as to justify the 
effort that would be involved in fund-raising, recruiting editors, nego-
tiating with publishers etc. In short, is it realistic to think in terms of a 
single sub-project lasting 4–5 years which would result in the publication 
of 4–7 volumes and making available in rough typescript approximately 
13,326 pages of unpublished manuscript? 
W.L. Twining 
Claire Gobbi 
29 October 1981
